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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]e find ourselves forced to hunt for a solution in the dark jungles of the second
best.'
If saving a life is worth spending $1 million today, how much
should we spend to save a life in twenty years? The answer, according
to the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is $150,000.2
OMB uses a ten percent annual "discount rate" to convert future regu-
latory costs and benefits into their "present value."' Because govern-
ment regulation of carcinogens cannot be expected to affect the cancer
ralte for twenty or thirty years,4 OMB's choice of discount rates has dra-
matic implications for regulatory policy. Its choice of discount rates has
even greater impact on long-term global environmental issues such as
ozone depletion and the greenhouse effect.5 For instance, if the green-
house effect will cost society $100 billion twenty years from now, OMB's
current discount rate would indicate that it is not worth spending $20
billion today to avert the harm.
Significant legal implications also accompany the discounting is-
sue's policy ramifications. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,6 the
Fifth Circuit invalidated the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
1. William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 788, 789 (1968).
2. Under its proposed reduction of the regulatory discount rate to seven percent, OMB would
calculate the value of a life in 20 years at $260,000. See notes 10 and 122 and accompanying text.
Throughout this Article, we will assume that inflation has been "factored out," so that both inter-
est rates and dollar amounts are given in "real" rather than "nominal" terms.
3. OMB Circular A-94 at 4 (1972). For an introductory treatment, see Zygmunt Plater, Rob-
ert Abrahams, and William Goldfarb, Environmental Law and Policy 59-63 (West, 1992). For the
neophyte, Part II.B of this Article explains the terms "discount rate" and "present value."
The issue of discounting the benefits of environmental regulation figured to play a prominent
role in the confirmation controversy over Supreme Court nominee Douglas Ginsburg in 1987,
before Ginsburg withdrew his name from nomination. As chief of regulatory policy at OMB in
1985, Ginsburg reportedly forced EPA to withdraw proposed asbestos bans because the costs of the
project outweighed discounted future benefits, including human lives saved. According to a New
York Times account, OMB assigned a $1 million value to each life saved by regulation, but due to
long latency periods of asbestos-related cancer, OMB fixed the discounted value of the "benefit" of
saving a life at only $22,000. A contemporary report by the U.S. House Committee on Energy and
Commerce characterized such a calculus as "morally repugnant." Robert Pear and Jeff Gerth,
Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of Ginsburg, N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 1, 1987). More recently,
then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr. vigorously attacked the use of discounting. See Albert Gore, Jr.,
Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit 190-91 (Houghton Mifflin, 1992).
4. The EPA estimates the "latency" period for asbestos-related lung cancer at 20 years from
the time of exposure and the latency period for asbestos-related mesothelioma at 25-30 years. Fi-
nal Rule: Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibi-
tions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29460, 29469 (1989).
5. See Maureen Cropper and Wallace Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J.
Econ. Lit. 675, 725-27 (1992) (noting the significance of the choice of discount rates in the analysis
of carcinogen regulation under CERCLA and RCRA, as well as for global environmental issues).
6. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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carefully considered regulations of asbestos products. Among other ob-
jections to the regulations,' the court found EPA's method of compar-
ing the costs and benefits of an asbestos ban to be unacceptable. The
court held that EPA must discount future benefits and that EPA's dis-
counting method gave too much weight to future deaths.8 Although our
discussion concerns more than just toxics regulation, Corrosion Proof
Fittings illustrates the significance of the issue not only for policy ana-
lysts but also for attorneys.
After several years of review, OMB recently proposed a substantial
revision of its twenty-year-old discount policy.9 Among other changes,
OMB proposes increased guidance for government agencies in the use
of discount rates in cost-benefit analysis and a reduction of the discount
rate from ten percent to seven percent. Coming two decades after the
last revision, OMB's current proposal seems an appropriate point to
take stock of federal discount rate policy, its underlying assumptions,
its impact on environmental policy choices, and its lessons for the com-
ing decades.
This Article attempts to untangle the complex and often obscure
debate about the choice of discount rates. It will emphasize the issue of
discounting lives, but that issue cannot be readily separated from the
7. The court conducted a wide-ranging review of EPA's methods and analysis and found
them wanting in numerous respects. The court based its holding on two general grounds: the EPA
failed to consider all necessary evidence, and it failed to consider intermediate regulatory alterna-
tives between a total ban and the status quo. Id. at 1215. The latter conclusion rested on language
in the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which requires the Agency to promulgate regulations
that adequately protect safety in the "least burdensome" manner and establishes a hierarchy of
regulatory alternatives in descending order of burden. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a)). Two particularly useful articles on the proper role of courts in risk management are
Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027
(1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 Yale J. Reg.
89 (1988).
8. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218. The court made several comments on EPA
discounting practices:
i. Because the EPA discounted future costs of the regulation, primarily costs of compliance to
asbestos products manufacturers, it must discount future benefits "to preserve an apples-to-apples
comparison."
ii. The EPA must discount "non-monetary" benefits (primarily human lives saved).
iii. The correct time to discount benefits from elimination of asbestos is the time of injury, not
the time of exposure to asbestos used by the EPA. (This is significant because a long latency
period generally elapses between exposure to asbestos and the onset of asbestos-related disease).
iv. The EPA must quantify and discount benefits for a period longer than 13 years in the
future.
v. "[Sloon-to-be-incurred costs are more harmful than postponable costs."
Id. at 1218-19. For commentary on Corrosion Proof Fittings, see Robert Percival, et al., Environ-
mental Regulation: Law, Science and Policy 565-70 (Little, Brown, 1992).
9. Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed.
Reg. 35613 (1992) (proposed Aug. 10, 1992).
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broader problem of discounting other regulatory costs and benefits.10
Thus, our discussion of discounting is also directly relevant to long-
term environmental issues such as biodiversity. In particular, most of
the same issues arise when cost-benefit analysis seeks to incorporate the
intrinsic value placed on the continued existence of an endangered spe-
cies or other nonhuman lives such as whales or redwoods.
Part II briefly reviews the current role of economic efficiency and
cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation, with particular regard
to the problem of assigning a monetary value to human lives. We then
explain the basic concept of 'discounting and demonstrate the momen-
tous impact that choice of a discount rate can have on environmental
cost-benefit analyses. Part III explores the debate surrounding the se-
lection of the proper discount rate. Part IV examines questions of fair-
ness to future generations affected by discounting future environmental
benefits. Finally, Part V considers how the discounting debate sheds
light on the proper uses of cost-benefit analysis.
The discounting issue combines technical economics with philo-
sophical conundrums. Although we will offer suggestions about the
proper choice of discount rates, most of our views are necessarily tenta-
tive. Nevertheless, one point seems fairly clear: OMB has set its current
discount rate too high. This has resulted in an unwarranted curtailment
of important environmental regulations.
Before beginning our analysis, it may be helpful for us to explain
our general perspective. Essentially, we have attempted to adopt the
vantage point of a policymaker in a democratic society, and to ask how
such a policymaker should think about long-term programs. Regardless
of whether the policymaker uses a formal cost-benefit analysis, she will
probably need to understand the trade-offs between environmental pro-
tection and economic welfare. Two kinds of trade-offs become especially
important for long-term projects. First, money invested in environmen-
tal protection might otherwise have been invested in other productive
assets. Thus, environmental protection may come at the cost of eco-
10. Toxics regulation under TSCA happens to be the issue in Corrosion Proof Fittings. The
issues and arguments in this Article apply more broadly to most regulatory decisions in which
costs are balanced with benefits and the benefits include human lives saved or human health pre-
served. For example, in Department of Transportation cost-benefit analyses of various automobile
safety regulations, a primary benefit is often lives saved or injuries avoided. The question of dis-
counting such future benefits necessarily arises in that process. Most of the discounting literature
has focused on questions of economic benefits from the use of natural resources, with very little
consideration of human life and health. Much of this Article attempts to adapt those arguments to
the question of discounting human life. Because of the paramount value placed on human life in
our culture, these questions are more resistant to neat mathematical formulas and (properly, we
think) arouse greater passions. To the extent that people have come to view parts of the ecology as
also possessing intrinsic value (as opposed to simply "use value"), similar issues arise.
[Vol. 46:267
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nomic growth. Here, the trade-offs really depend upon whether environ-
mental protection diverts funds from other investments (rather than
from current consumption), not on when society receives the benefits.
Second, long-term projects produce benefits in the future at the ex-
pense of consumption in the present, and the delay may affect how soci-
ety evaluates the trade-off between current and future welfare. We
favor an approach to discounting that treats these factors separately, 1
but even if the decisionmaker adopts a different methodology, we be-
lieve she will want to have information about both effects. We have or-
ganized our presentation accordingly.
From the vantage point of our (possibly imaginary) thoughtful poli-
cymaker, workability is more crucial than theoretical rigor. Economic
theorists and professional philosophers rightly concentrate on concep-
tual nuances and complexities, but the policymaker needs more prag-
matic solutions. Furthermore, in a democratic society, the policymaker
may have some freedom of action, but also must give weight to the
views of the public. For this reason, in evaluating various positions re-
garding discounting, we have felt free to appeal to what we believe to be
generally shared value judgments.
One final introductory point, in the interests of candor. Our belief
that the democratic policymaker must give weight to public opinion
does not mean government by opinion poll. We believe that our society
as a whole, and government in particular, focuses too much on the pre-
sent and is investing too little for the future.12 Thus, we think the poli-
cymaker should "lean against the wind" a bit, taking a longer view than
the latest polls or market reports. Consequently, within the range of
positions that seem reasonably supportable, we have leaned toward fu-
ture-mindedness, which translates into a preference for lower discount
rates.
11. This is the so-called "shadow price of capital" approach. See text accompanying notes
85-90.
12. See text accompanying notes 72-74 for further discussion of the need for increased in-
vestment in the future. Although we do not focus on questions of institutional design in this Arti-
cle, it may be appropriate to consider mechanisms that would encourage long-range
decisionmaking.
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:267
II. A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND
DISCOUNTING
A. The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Regulation
Most federal environmental statutes that regulate health risks
favor feasibility analysis over cost-benefit analysis.13 For example, the
Clean Air Act mandates the use of maximum achievable control tech-
nology to curb emission of hazardous air pollutants.14 Although numer-
ous provisions of environmental statutes require EPA to consider
economic factors, none explicitly requires a formal cost-benefit analysis.
Some commentators argue that economic efficiency should have little
role in environmental regulation.15 Nevertheless, in the past decade the
federal government has applied cost-benefit analysis increasingly in
policymaking, including environmental regulation. President Reagan's
famous Executive Order 12,291, promulgated in 1981, requires agencies
issuing "major rules" to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that
the benefits of a proposed regulation outweigh its costs.' 6 Executive Or-
der 12,291 effectively provides a cost-benefit overlay for all major fed-
eral regulatory actions.' 7 In Corrosion Proof Fittings, for instance, EPA
and the Fifth Circuit independently concluded that the decisionmaking
13. See Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21 En-
vir. L. 1321 (1991) (analyzing another case involving asbestos and suggesting that feasibility analy-
sis and cost-benefit analysis may lead to the same environmental policy conclusions).
14. Clean Air Act § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
15. Mark Sagoff is a particularly strong critic. See, for example, Mark Sagoff, The Economy
of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (Cambridge, 1988); Mark Sagoff, Economic
Theory and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1393 (1981). See also Daniel A. Farber, From
Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 337 (arguing that efficiency is relevant but
should not be the governing standard for social policy). But see Christopher H. Schroeder, In the
Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility Analysis Is the Answer, What is the Ques-
tion? 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1483 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Tempta-
tions of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name is Preference, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
1631 (1989) (criticizing Sagoff).
16. Executive Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981). The Order defines a "major rule"
as a regulation likely to produce, inter alia, an annual impact of $100 million or more on the
American economy or a major increase in costs or prices. Id.
17. For example, the Clean Air Act requires that EPA set primary air quality standards for
criteria pollutants based solely on the level necessary to protect human health. Clean Air Act
§ 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988). The act prohibits the Agency from considering costs in promulgat-
ing these standards. Nonetheless, EPA must conduct the "Regulatory Impact Analysis" (cost-ben-
efit analysis) required by Executive Order No. 12,291. EPA internal rules require the RIA to state
explicitly that the Agency cannot use cost-benefit analysis to determine the standard. EPA Regula-
tory Impact Analysis Guidelines (1983). However, once the analysis becomes part of the record, it
tends to influence the decision; further, if such analysis shows very high costs, it may provide
impetus for legislative change. See discussion in Ann Fisher, An Overview and Evaluation of
EPA's Guidelines for Conducting Regulatory Impact Analysis, in V. Kerry Smith, ed., Environ-
mental Policy under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis (Chapel Hill,
1984).
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process should include a cost-benefit analysis although the statute does
not explicitly require one.'
More recently, President Bush imposed a ninety-day moratorium
on new regulations. During the moratorium, agencies were instructed to
review existing regulations to ensure compliance with the following
standards (among others):
(a) The expected benefits to society of any regulation should clearly outweigh
the expected costs it imposes on society.
(b) Regulations should be fashioned to maximize net benefits to society. 1'
As this executive order illustrates, economic analysis, including effi-
ciency and cost-benefit criteria, is flourishing in federal policymaking.
Cost-benefit analysis and its components, including discounting, appear
likely to shape environmental policymaking for the foreseeable future.
Valuation is a key step in conducting a cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis requires that future benefits be expressed in monetary
terms. For goods freely traded on the market, such an assumption is
often reasonable. However, for "nonmarket goods" like human life (or
the inherent value people place on the existence of other species), the
assignment of a monetary value is much more controversial. Even as-
suming agreement on the propriety of "monetizing" human life, deriv-
ing an accurate value is a difficult task. Existing regulations establish
values ranging from $70,000 to $132 million per life saved.2 0 This tre-
mendous range attests to the difficulty of assigning a specific monetary
value to human lives saved. Similar problems hinder efforts to establish
18. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1214; 54 Fed. Reg. at 29467 (cited in note 4).
19. Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation, 28 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 232, 233 (Feb. 17, 1992). President Bush later announced strict timetables and progress
report requirements and extended the moratorium on new regulations to enhance compliance with
the new directive. The President also directed agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses of major
legislative proposals, thus significantly expanding the role of cost-benefit analysis, and by implica-
tion, that of the discount rate. Memorandum on Implementing Regulatory Reforms, 28 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 728 (Apr. 29, 1992).
20. Clayton P. Gillette and Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal Agency Valuations of Human Life,
A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States 2 (1988) (citing Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, 1987-88). Another
study by Kip Viscusi found a narrower range among federal agencies using labor market studies as
a basis for the value assigned to lives saved. That study found that the agency estimates varied
between $818,000 and $15.5 million. (We have adjusted these numbers to 1991 dollars using the
consumer price index. Viscusi's results were in 1982 dollars). See W. Kip Viscusi, The Valuation of
Risks to Life and Health: Guidelines for Policy Analysis, in Judith D. Bentkover, Vincent T.
Covello, and Jeryl Mumpower, eds., Benefits Assessment: The State of the Art 200-02 (Dordrecht,
1986). For a cogent recent overview, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 Cleve. St. L.
Rev. 209 (1990).
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a value for the continued existence of an endangered species apart from
the species' direct usefulness to humans.21
When economists talk about placing a value on a human life, they
are referring to a statistical life, not to the value of the life of any par-
ticular individual. Such valuation essentially attempts to measure what
preventing the death of an unidentified person (a "statistical death") is
worth to society.2 Economists suggest several alternative methods for
assigning a value to a life saved by regulation, including measures of
discounted lifetime consumption, human capital (sometimes called the
discounted lifetime production approach), net contribution to society,
jury awards in compensation for death, and willingness to pay.23 Each
approach is open to criticism, but economists generally agree that will-
ingness to pay is the best measure.24
Economists generally use two methods to estimate society's willing-
ness to pay to preserve a life. The first is to use wage differentials be-
tween risky and safe occupations to determine the increase in earnings
that individuals demand for an incremental increase in risk. That incre-
ment can be extrapolated to determine the value workers implicitly
place on their lives. A second method-which can also be modified to
measure the value placed on endangered species or other aspects of na-
ture-is simply to ask individuals what risk premium they require, us-
ing a "contingent valuation" survey.2 5
Even assuming that we can estimate accurately what individuals
are willing to pay to save a life, the use of such an estimate presents
troubling difficulties. Most obviously, willingness to pay depends on
ability to pay. Wealthy individuals and groups may be "willing" to pay
substantially more for an increment of risk reduction than poor individ-
uals.26 Further, individuals may inaccurately estimate risk and incor-
21. For a debate about the appropriateness of including those valuations in cost-benefit anal-
ysis, see Donald H. Rosenthal and Robert H. Nelson, Why Existence Value Should Not be Used
in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 116 (1992); Raymond J. Kopp, Why Exis-
tence Value Should Be Used in Cost Benefit Analysis, 11 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 123 (1992).
22. This distinction simplifies the analysis, partly because it eliminates any need to deter-
mine the relative "value" of different individuals' lives. For a good description of the concept of
statistical deaths, see Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence 113-45 (Harvard, 1984).
23. One of the best sources describing these alternative measures of the value of a life is
Richard Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives, 23 Pub. Pol'y 419 (1975).
24. See Viscusi, Valuation of Risks at 207 (cited in note 20).
25. See Miley W. Merkhofer, Decision Science And Social Risk Management 98-101 (Dor-
drecht, 1987). For critical views of this methodology, see Steven Shavell, Contingent Valuation of
the Nonuse Value of Natural Resources: Implications for Public Policy and the Liability Sys-
tems, Harv. L. & Econ. Disc. Paper No. 109 (May 1992); Note, "Ask a Silly Question ...
Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1981 (1992).
26. Viscusi states the problem and his response:
The richer one is, the safer the job one will select from any given wage-risk schedule that
is offered in the market, other things being equal. Society may wish to redistribute income...
[Vol. 46:267
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rectly respond to these risks in terms of wage demands for a variety of
reasons, including incomplete information, other market imperfections,
and misperception of risk."7
Another objection to willingness-to-pay as a measure is its depen-
dence on the initial assignment of rights. Generally, people will require
a larger payment to relinquish a right than they will pay to acquire that
right.'8 In order to determine willingness to pay, the decisionmaker
must first decide whether an individual already has a right to the good
in question. In the asbestos situation, for example, the policymaker
would need to determine in advance whether individuals have a right to
a healthful, asbestos-free environment.2" Similarly, if the government
conducted cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to save whales, the
result could turn on whether the initial entitlement is assigned to whal-
ers or Greenpeace.30
Apart from the difficulty of placing a dollar value on life, overall
reductions in the levels of human mortality may not fully capture the
benefits of toxics regulation. Society also may place importance on
other characteristics of risks, such as potential clustering of victims. 3 '
Moreover, regulations may have important incidental benefits that reg-
so that people will not find it necessary to increase their income through hazardous work, but
in terms of the market choices, these different tradeoffs reflect the preferences individuals
exhibit.
Viscusi, Valuation of Risks at 197. This response seems to place excessive reliance on the market,
ignoring the tremendous cost (and market distortions) of such redistributional programs in rela-
tion to the cost of developing an alternative measure for valuing life.
27. See, for example, Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Inter-
est, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1021, 1035 (1989) (citing Ames Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Rational
Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology 67 (Chi., 1987)); E.J. Mishan, Consis-
tency in the Valuation of Human Life: A Wild Goose Chase?, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Jeffrey Paul,
and Fred D. Miller, Jr., eds., Ethics and Economics 152 (Oxford, 1985).
28. See, for example, Farber, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 1023-24.
29. One possible resolution of this problem is to assume the existence of the right-for exam-
ple, a right to an environment as nearly free of risk of asbestos-related death as possible-and
determine how much society would pay to give up that right. This would establish an upper bound
on the value of the benefit. If, after discounting, costs still exceed the value of the benefit, cost-
benefit analysis would indicate that the government should abandon the regulation. We have based
the objection in the text and this proposed solution on Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation: Ethical and Philosophical Considerations, in
Daniel Swartzman, Richard A. Liroff, and Kevin G. Croke, eds., Cost-Benefit Analysis and Envi-
ronmental Regulations: Politics, Ethics, and Methods 137 (Conservation Found., 1982).
30. See Farber, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 1023-24.
31. See, for example, Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562, 584-629 (1992).
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ulators may have even more difficulty quantifying. Analysts tend to
omit these "soft variables" from the analysis.2
For example, in Corrosion Proof Fittings, EPA's calculation of the
benefits of an asbestos ban focused on lives saved by the elimination of
asbestos and essentially ignored other benefits.33 Failure to include ben-
efits like reduced treatment costs and diminished environmental degra-
dation caused a significant underestimation of the benefits of asbestos
regulation. While EPA mentioned potential illness-and-treatment costs
avoided, it failed to include them in its cost-benefit calculation.34 Simi-
larly, though it acknowledged that an asbestos ban could produce sig-
nificant ecological benefits, EPA declined to consider such advantages
because it found them too difficult to quantify. 5 TSCA protects not
only human health, but also the environment.3 6 EPA failed to explain
why it considered environmental benefits too hard to quantify, but was
undaunted by the task of quantifying the benefits in terms of lives
saved.3 7
Even if saving lives is the primary regulatory goal, statistical deaths
avoided may provide an inapt measure of the regulation's value. Placing
a value on the small reduction in risk of asbestos-related death that
would accrue to each individual provides one alternative to the statisti-
cal-deaths-avoided approach. Summation of all individual benefits
would yield the total social benefit. Such a measure avoids some of the
problems presented by placing a value on life (for example, the distor-
tion involved in extrapolating from small risks valuations to an estimate
of the value for certain death) and may more accurately reflect the ac-
tual impact of the decision."' On the other hand, reliable information
32. See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 66
(1972). In general, the "willingness to pay" valuation of mortality is likely to undervalue regulatory
benefits, so it may at least provide a useful "lower bound."
33. 54 Fed. Reg. at 29485-87 (cited in note 4).
34. The societal resources devoted to treatment of toxics-related illnesses are potentially sig-
nificant, but EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidelines do not direct EPA to consider those
benefits. Thus, EPA systematically excludes a potentially significant benefit of toxics regulation
from consideration.
35. 54 Fed. Reg. at 29480, 29486 (cited in note 4).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1988) (directing regulation of toxics "which present an un-
reasonable risk of injury to health or the environment") (emphasis added).
37. EPA's calculations also failed to.include the benefits of reduced anxiety that result from
the reduced risk of asbestos-related illness or death. According to one commentator, "the pain
associated with the awareness of risk-with the prospect of death-is probably often commensu-
rate with the costs of death itself." Schelling, Choice and Consequence at 130 (cited in note 22).
(Obviously, only the change in anxiety levels is relevant, since regulation can postpone but not
eliminate mortality.) Unquestionably, regulators would have difficulty measuring such benefits, but
similar difficulty has not prevented inclusion of other benefits in the cost-benefit calculation.
38. EPA actually proposed such an approach in an early draft of its Regulatory Impact Anal-
ysis guidelines. See Fisher, Overview and Evaluation at 113-14 (cited in note 17).
(Vol. 46:267276
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on these valuations seems difficult to obtain. The degree to which indi-
viduals discount future health effects provides an important determi-
nant of individual valuation of risks. This, however, simply returns us
to our central concern, the problem of determining an appropriate dis-
count rate.
B. An Introduction to Discounting
The basic principle underlying discounting is simple: A dollar to-
day is worth more than a dollar at some time in the future. This is the
same "time value" principle that underlies the concept of interest. Sup-
pose lender L loans borrower B $100 in year one, to be repaid in year
two. L will forego current use of the $100 only if B pays her a premium
for that forgone use when B repays the loan in year two. That premium
is interest. If B and L agree that B will pay $110 in year two for the use
of L's $100 in year one, the simple interest rate is ten percent.39 If we
asked L how much $110 in year two is worth to her today, she would
presumably answer "$100." L "discounts" the money she will receive in
the future by ten percent. This reflects the time value of money princi-
ple: X dollars one year from now is worth less than X dollars today.
The term "present value" describes the current value to the recipi-
ent of a benefit that will be conferred in the future. In the above exam-
ple, the present value to L of $110 in year 2 is $100. The ten percent
rate L uses to discount the money she will receive in year two is called
the "discount rate." Note that this analysis also applies to costs to be
incurred in the future. Everything else being equal, L would be indiffer-
ent between paying a cost (for example, a tax) of $110 in year two or
$100 today, because L discounts future costs at a simple rate of ten
percent per year.
The arithmetic becomes more complicated when more than one pe-
riod is involved. As money or monetary costs are conferred further in
the future, compound interest decreases their present value geometri-
cally. The formula for determining the present value of a sum to be
conferred in some future year is:
Bt
(1 + r)t
where Bt represents the amount that the beneficiary will receive in fu-
ture year t, r stands for the discount rate, and t represents the number
39. Looking at this from a preference perspective, economists might say L is indifferent be-
tween $100 today and $110 next year. (As usual, we are factoring inflation out of these figures. See
note 2.)
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of years from the present when the beneficiary receives the money.40 By
substituting the monetary value of the benefit for Bt, one can use the
above formula to determine the present value of any future benefit that
can be expressed in monetary terms. Analysts similarly can discount
future costs expressed in monetary terms to present value.41
The costs and benefits of a given government policy often extend
over more than one year. A policy generally distributes those costs and
benefits unequally over time, so simple comparison of gross costs and
gross benefits would ignore the time value of money. Consequently,
cost-benefit analysts generally discount all costs and benefits to present
value before comparing them. The difference between the present value
of all benefits and the present value of all costs of a project or regula-
tion is often called its "Net Present Value" (NPV). A positive NPV
(benefits exceed costs) suggests that the government should adopt a
regulation and a negative NPV suggests that it should not.
Thus, to determine the NPV, the policymaker must derive a social
discount rate that reflects the time value of the stream of costs and
benefits for the entire population affected by the regulation.4 2 Determi-
nation of the appropriate discount rate presents a tremendous practical
problem that federal agencies have not resolved uniformly, despite
prodding from OMB.4 3
Though justification of the discount rate and estimates of its nu-
merical value vary substantially, economists generally agree that cost-
benefit analysis requires discounting future benefits and costs to pre-
sent value. Given this consensus regarding the need for discounting, an
understanding of the impact of the choice of discount rate on the re-
sults of cost-benefit analysis becomes important. As the Table on the
40. This formula makes several simplifying assumptions not detailed here. Most elementary
statistics books and most books on cost-benefit analysis describe more complicated and accurate
formulas and their derivation, including how to determine the present value of a stream of future
costs or benefits. See, for example, Edward M. Gramlich, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis 92-110
(Prentice-Hall, 2d ed. 1990).
41. If analysts failed to discount benefits and costs at the same rate, odd results would occur.
For example, in a future "wash transaction," the costs and benefits will cancel when the transac-
tion occurs, giving the transaction no net economic effect. But the cost and benefit would discount
to different numbers, so a future wash transaction would not have a present value of zero.
42. Very generally, the social discount rate "is that rate which, when applied to future costs
and benefits, yields their actual present social values ... the rate at which society as a whole is
willing to trade off present for future costs and benefits." Peter G. Sassone and William A. Schaf-
fer, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Handbook 98 (Academic, 1978).
43. Actual rates applied by federal agencies vary from 0% to 10%. OMB recommends a rate
of 10%, but most economists agree that this is probably too high. See Gillette and Hopkins, Fed-
eral Agency Valuations at 67 (cited in note 20). EPA generally applies a rate between 0% and 5%.
It applied a 3% rate in developing the asbestos rule, reflecting its estimate of the historical real
rate of interest. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218. That estimate is probably too high. See
note 59 and accompanying text.
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following page illustrates, discounting can dramatically affect the value
of a proposed regulation's costs or benefits," depending on the size of
the discount rate and the length of time before society realizes the costs
or benefits. Because society often incurs the costs of environmental reg-
ulation long before the benefits," compound discounting generally has a
greater impact in the calculation of the present value of benefits than of
costs.
Discounted Value of One Million Dollar Benefit at
Selected Discount Rates4"
Value in Nth Year Discount Rate
Discount Rate
YEAR 5 10 20 30 40
0 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
1 050,000 900,000 820,000 740,000 670,000
3 860,000 740,000 550,000 410,000 300,000
5 780,000 610,000 380,000 230,000 140,000
7 710,000 510,000 260,000 130,000 70,000
10 620,000 390,000 150,000 60,000 20,000
15 500,000 250,000 60,000 20,000 -ZERO-
Given these dramatic figures, it should be no surprise that methods of
discounting are critical to cost-benefit analysis and often pivotal in reg-
ulatory decisions,4
III. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE
Finding the correct discount rate requires a deeper analysis of why
people prefer a given "quantity" of present benefit over the same
44. Because the primary concern of this Article is government regulation that directs private
industry to take some action to reduce health or environmental hazards, we will focus on the anal-
ysis of costs and benefits of such regulation, rather than a public works project. Because a public
works project provides the paradigm for cost-benefit analysis, many of the sources cited below
primarily address such projects. However, the essential concepts drawn from those analyses are
transferrable to the regulation context.
45. See Gillette and Hopkins, Federal Agency Valuations at 54-57 (cited in note 20). This is
true in toxics regulation due to the frequently long latency period between exposure and the onset
of toxics-related disease. For example, virtually all the costs of the EPA asbestos rule would have
accrued within six years. 54 Fed. Reg. at 29461-62 (cited in note 4). EPA estimated the benefits of
the regulation over 13 years, and the Fifth Circuit criticized the agency's failure to estimate the
benefits further into the future. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218-19.
46. Compound rates from Sassone and Schaffer, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 128 (cited in note
42).
47. "Experience has shown that cost-benefit results are generally quite sensitive to the dis-
count rate." Id. See also Fisher, Overview and Evaluation at 108-11 (cited in note 17) (comment-
ing that selection of the discount rate is critical to determination of the result of EPA Regulatory
Impact Analysis under Executive Order No. 12,291).
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"quantity" of future benefit. Economists emphasize two explanations:
the opportunity cost of forgone benefits, and pure time preference
(impatience).48
Economists base the concept of social opportunity cost on the pro-
ductivity of capital. Generally, investment of resources today generates
a larger quantity of resources available for future consumption. Thus,
the future return from investment (which itself represents forgone pre-
sent consumption) is essentially a future flow of consumption. The in-
terest rate, and thus the discount rate, reflect the opportunity cost of
relinquishing present consumption.49
The pure time preference principle is grounded mostly in impa-
tience; people prefer receiving benefits immediately over receiving them
some time in the future. Economists sometimes call the discount rate
derived from this principle the Social Time Preference Rate.50 Pure
time preference also may evidence a belief that future societies are
likely to be richer, making an extra dollar of benefit worth less in the
future than it is to the current society. Economists often call this ra-
tionale for discounting the "diminishing marginal utility" argument.
Most economists agree that the discount rate that the time preference
explanation suggests-which we will call the social discount rate-is
substantially lower than the rate that the opportunity cost indicates.5 1
Current estimates, based on the long-term real rate of return on riskless
investments (Treasury notes and bonds), are in the neighborhood of
one percent.52
48. Our discussion loosely follows the description of social opportunity cost and social time
preference in David W. Pearce and R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the
Environment 212-17 (Johns Hopkins, 1990). Most cost-benefit texts contain similar discussions.
49. Some economists argue for a discount rate as high or higher than the prevailing capital
market rate of interest. See, for example, Baumol, Social Rate of Discount (cited in note 1). Others
argue for a substantially lower rate. See, for example, Stephen A. Marglin, The Social Rate of
Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, 77 Q. J. Econ. 95 (1963). Much of the scholarly
discussion about the proper discount rate for costs and benefits of government actions focuses on
government public works projects and the differences between tax-financed and bond-financed
projects. That debate is not directly relevant to the question of a government regulation for which
private investment entirely finances compliance.
50. Pearce and Turner, Economics of Natural Resources at 213 (cited in note 48).
51. Some economists suggest that the proper social discount rate is a hybrid opportunity
cost/time preference rate. Under this theory, all costs (both foregone investment and foregone con-
sumption) of regulation are converted to consumption units. Those units can then be discounted at
the social rate of time preference. See Gramlich, Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis at 102 (cited in
note 40).
52. See note 58.
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In a world without taxes, the social discount rate should equal the
opportunity cost. But the tax system drives a wedge between the two."3
For example, if individuals use a two-percent discount rate for personal
consumption, they will choose to save only if given a two-percent re-
turn. But to generate a two-percent return after taxes to consumers,
firms must invest in projects offering a higher return. If business and
personal taxes take a combined "bite" of fifty percent out of firm in-
come by the time it reaches shareholders, the firm will need to earn a
four-percent return in order to give shareholders their two-percent af-
ter-tax return. Thus, in this simple example, the social discount rate is
two percent, while the implicit opportunity cost of capital is four per-
cent. As we will see, the distinction between the social discount rate and
the opportunity cost of capital has crucial importance for cost-benefit
analysis. 4
A. Intragenerational Time Preferences and the Social Discount
Rate
One rationale for discounting is a simple preference for a benefit
today over the same benefit tomorrow. As an empirical observation of
psychology, humans are often impatient.15 However, the issue of
whether impatience and preferences based on that emotion are a ra-
tional56 or prudent basis for public policy decisions remains open for
debate. Even economists generally agree that time preference provides
a weaker justification for discounting than social opportunity cost. Pref-
erences can change over time because of what one commentator de-
scribes as a "defect of the telescopic faculty. ' 57 For example, a person
might express a time preference for saving one life today over ten lives
in twenty years, but after the twenty years have elapsed, that same per-
son may favor saving the ten lives. If policymakers discount future ben-
efits based on the aggregate (social) time preference at the time of the
53. See Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for
Evaluating National Energy Options, in Robert C. Lind, et al. Discounting for Time and Risk in
Energy Policy 24-32 (Resources for the Future, 1982).
54. Another important and recondite issue, which we will not discuss, is how to adjust the
discount rate when the return on a government project is risky. See, for example, Robert Wilson,
Risk Measurement of Public Projects, in Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 205 (Resources
for the Future, 1982).
55. See Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 438 (Cambridge, 1988).
56. John Rawls argues that, assuming a future benefit is no less certain than a current bene-
fit, preferring one simply on the grounds of temporal proximity is irrational. John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice § 45 (Belknap, 1971). On the other hand, discounting may have evolutionary advantages
given the risk that death may intervene before the decisionmaker receives future benefits. See Alan
Rogers, The Evolution of Time Preference (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
57. Robert E. Goodin, Discounting Discounting, 2 J. Pub. Pol'y 53, 55 (1982) (citing A.C.
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan, 4th ed., 1932)).
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decision, they may make decisions that the society will later realize
were biased imprudently in favor of small present benefits.
In some sense, saying that future consumption is less beneficial
than present consumption is clearly wrong. We may currently place a
lower value on the right to drink a milkshake a year from now than on
drinking one today. But this does not mean that when we do drink the
milkshake, it will taste any worse (or have any fewer calories). More-
over, leaving a milkshake in the freezer for a year will not result in 1.02
milkshakes at the end of the year; milkshakes, like human lives, do not
compound. Discounting future consumption on the basis of time prefer-
ence simply reflects the fact that most people would rather drink a
milkshake now than wait a year. Applying the same interest rate to
harmful events like deaths implies a preference for postponing pain.
Whether these preferences have any rational basis is unclear, even
when ordinary consumer goods are involved, let alone human lives or
endangered species."
Quite apart from concerns about the rationality of individual time
preferences, deriving a discount factor from individual behavior is not
easy. According to economic theory, rational individuals should use a
single discount rate for both saving and borrowing over all time periods.
The empirical evidence indicates a quite different result. Riskless in-
vestments provide a very low real rate of return, approximately one per-
cent or so.59 On the other hand, people are willing to borrow money at
significantly higher rates, even while maintaining low-interest invest-
ments."' They also seem to discount future gains differently than future
58. We are not fully convinced, however, that policymakers rationally should weigh future
and present experiences equally. To ask our present selves to give the same weight to future exper-
iences as to present ones, seems in some sense to deny the reality of time, asking us to treat time
as an illusion that should be ignored for purposes of rational decisionmaking.
59. See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 961, 985-86
(1992) (stating that the most reliable estimate of the real, riskless rate of return is 0.5%); Robert
C. Lind, Reassessing the Government's Discount Rate Policy in Light of New Theory and Data in
a World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mobility, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. S-8, S-24
(1990) (stating that the government's borrowing cost is between one and three percent); Charles
W. Howes, Introduction: The Social Discount Rate, 18 J. Envir. Econ. &. Mgmt. S-3, S-4 (1990)
(offering a two percent estimate); Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 73, 76, 83-84 (cited in
note 53) (stating that a real risk-free rate of return is "near zero").
60. See George Loewenstein and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J.
Econ. Persp. 181 (1989). See also Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1300-11 (1991) (describing differences in
a given individual's time preferences depending on temporal distance and psychological factors,
neither adequately explained by a consistent time-preference theory); Lind, 18 J. Envir. Econ. &
Mgmt. at S-8 (discussing consumer borrowing and investing at inconsistent rates and compart-
mentalization of investment decisions, all of which result in a single individual exhibiting several
disparate rates of time preference).
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losses, contrary to conventional economic theory. 1 Sometimes, people
even will pay money in order to save, as in the once-popular Christmas
clubs. These clubs offered the opportunity to lock up funds with no
interest (meaning a real loss of value, given inflation), so that individu-
als would have them available during the holiday season. A desire of
people to precommit to various levels of savings seems responsible for
at least some of these disparities. This desire may make it rational to
tie up some funds for a two-percent return while borrowing on a credit
card at a much higher real rate.2 As Professor Lind explains:
Recent developments in behavioral economics suggest that it may not be irrational
for the individual to keep budgets separated because of problems associated with
self-control. The person who regularly raided the children's college fund to pay off
consumer debts might soon find that the children had no money for college. The
reasoning is essentially the same as that which many people subscribe to when they
deliberately don't take more than a certain amount of money to Las Vegas or to a
race track.63
Turning specifically to discount rates for human lives, a recent sur-
vey conducted by economists at Resources For the Future asked a thou-
sand Maryland households about their preferences regarding saving
human life. 4 The survey results suggest that, on average, people would
discount future lives saved within 25 years at an annual rate of 8.6%,
but would use an annual rate of 3.4% if the time horizon is 100 years.65
A Swedish study using a different methodology found much lower rates,
in the neighborhood of .0001 percent.68 Responses to such surveys vary
61. Loewenstein and Thaler, 3 J. Econ. Persp. at 184, 187. The vast majority of economic
models employed in practice depend on assumptions of consistent intertemporal preferences and
positive discount rates. The fact that some economic theory is sufficiently flexible to factor in such
aberrations is of little practical significance because virtually all models used in policy analysis
depend on assumptions of consistent intertemporal preferences. Our references to "economic the-
ory" in the text refer to the standard economic models that form the basis of most current policy
analysis and criticism.
62. See id. A preference for liquidity to guard against unforeseen needs for funds may pro-
vide a related explanation with limited application for some apparently inconsistent investment
decisions. For example, a person may prefer to maintain some balance in a savings account bearing
five-percent interest even though she could earn 10% on a certificate of deposit that bears penal-
ties for early withdrawals. Keeping funds in the lower interest account that imposes no penalties
for early withdrawal allows her to hedge against extraordinary, unanticipated expenses like large
uninsured medical bills.
63. Lind, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. at S-19 (cited in note 59). This insight may have im-
portant implications regarding the appropriate discount rate for very long-term projects. See text
accompanying notes 109-11.
64. We have some doubts about the meaningfulness of these surveys. See text accompanying
note 118.
65. What Price Posterity?, The Economist 73 (Mar. 23, 1991). Neither the time preference
nor the opportunity cost theory explains why these people prefer a lower discount rate for benefits
received further in the future.
66. Maureen L. Cropper and Paul R. Portney, Discounting and the Evaluation of Lifesaving
Programs, 3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 369, 375 (1990).
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remarkably. In one study, about ten percent of the respondents had
negative discount rates,"7 while many others had (in effect) infinite dis-
count rates: they refused to give any weight to deaths occurring many
years in the future, on the ground that science would surely discover a
method of eliminating any risk in the meantime.6 8 Adding to the confu-
sion, an econometric effort to determine how much people discount
their own lives in the future derived a rate of about two percent, close
to the return on riskless investment.6 9
Even putting aside the additional perplexities of intergenerational
effects,7 ° these studies provide few clear answers. Economic theory as-
sumes a degree of consistency regarding intertemporal preferences that
seems questionable in the real world. There are also genuine normative
concerns about this kind of-discounting. Nevertheless, we believe that,
with respect to intragenerational effects, policymakers should use a
small discount rate in the neighborhood of one or two percent.71 Al-
though we do not claim that this position is logically unassailable, it is
supported by several pragmatic considerations.
Initially, we do not think that policymakers should set the social
discount rate higher than the real rate of return on riskless investment,
for several reasons. Setting the social discount rate higher than the ris-
kless investment interest rate would imply that the population cur-
rently saves too much. (If people save at two percent interest, but
discount their own future consumption at a higher rate, they are irra-
tionally trading current consumption for a level of later consumption
that they actually regard as less valuable.)72 This implication about sav-
ings is contrary to a broad consensus among economists and the public
67. Maureen L. Cropper, Sema K. Aydede, and Paul R. Portney, Discounting Human Lives,
1991 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1410, 1412. In another study, one-third of the respondents used zero or
negative discount rates. John K. Horowitz and Richard T. Carson, Discounting Statistical Lives, 3
J. Risk & Uncertainty 403, 410 (1990). This implies that the weight those respondents assign to
future lives equals or exceeds the weight they accord present lives.'
68. Cropper, Aydede, and Portney, 1991 Am. J. Agric. Econ. at 1411, 1412, 1415.
69. Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New
Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. S-51 (1990).
70. See Part IV.
71. In some theoretical sense, the precise appropriate rates might vary. This conclusion and
the following discussion, however, proceed from the assumption that attempting to determine a
different appropriate discount rate for every project whose potential benefits include saved human
lives is impractical. Further, different discount rates for different projects would complicate com-
parison of proposed public or private investments for those projects.
72. The problem is basically that the present value of future dollars depreciates faster than
the interest from the loans compounds. The situation resembles charging a lower rate of interest
on a loan than the rate of inflation, in that the decline in the present value of the future dollars (in
which the loan will be repaid) outpaces the interest on the loan.
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that American savings rates are actually too low.7" To counter this hy-
pothetical excessive saving, the government should then run the deficit
as high as possible, borrowing money at the riskless rate from foreign
investors in order to finance a current spending spree. Although that
fiscal policy bears an unfortunate resemblance to government actions
during the 1980s, we doubt that the idea of drastically increasing the
deficit would find much support.7 " This suggests that in setting the so-
cial discount rate the government should act as if the current savings
rate were either optimal or too low, not as if it were too high.
Moreover, as we have seen, empirical studies show that people use
a variety of discount rates in different situations. Among these rates,
the return on riskless investments is arguably the most relevant. Unlike
some of the empirical studies of how people would make hypothetical
choices, investment rates reflect actual decisions, and therefore indicate
preferences more accurately. As compared with many borrowing rates
(such as those on consumer credit), investment rates are less likely to
reflect impulsive decisions and are more likely to reflect thoughtful de-
liberation. They are also more likely to reflect long-term preferences, as
opposed to short-term desires for liquidity or other effects, such as the
practical unavailability of certain goods except on credit (e.g., equity
ownership of housing). 5 Finally, individuals seem to privilege their
long-term investment strategies, even when this requires rather expen-
sive efforts to protect against shorter-term impatience. This suggests
that investment returns reflect their considered judgment about time
preferences better than interest rates on consumer debt.
The preceding discussion suggests that policymakers should not set
the social discount rate for intragenerational effects at a higher rate
than the real rate of return on investments. Should they set it lower?
Although the question probably has more theoretical than practical sig-
nificance,76 it is not easy to resolve. The idea of a zero rate has substan-
73. Charles L. Schultze, Memos to the President: A Guide Through Macroeconomics for the
Busy Policymaker 236-54 (Brookings Inst., 1992); Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 445
(cited in note 53); Janet L. Yellen, Symposium on the Budget Deficit, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 17 (Spring
1989).
74. "We are living well by running up our debt and selling off our assets. America has thrown
itself a party and billed the tab to the future. The costs, which are only beginning to come due, will
include a lower standard of living for individual Americans and reduced American influence and
importance in world affairs." Yellen, 3 J. Econ. Persp. at 17 (quoting economist Benjamin Fried-
man). See B. Douglas Bernheim, A Neoclassical Perspective on Budget Deficits, 3 J. Econ. Persp.
55 (Spring 1989) (showing through public opinion polls that federal budget deficits are a critical
national economic concern, second only to unemployment).
75. Housing also serves partially as an investment, so the interest rates people are willing to
pay may in part reflect estimates of future appreciation.
76. Even over a 20-year period, the difference between a rate and a zero rate rarely is likely
to be decisive. As the Table earlier in this Article shows, the present value of a million dollars,
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tial appeal, since a death today and a death tomorrow are in some
fundamental sense equal. Nevertheless, we tentatively reject use of a
zero discount rate for two reasons. First, we are dealing here only with
discounting within a particular generation, not with obligations to later
generations.7 7 This means that the same individuals are involved in
both relevant time periods. The question is whether, in considering
costs or benefits to a particular individual, the government should ap-
ply a lower discount rate than that individual herself applies in reason-
ably well-considered personal decisions. Such a policy would raise
concerns about paternalism, which at least puts the burden of proof on
the proponents of a zero rate.
Second, setting the discount rate at zero would leave it below the
rate of return on riskless investments such as government bonds (which
also supplies the discount rate for ordinary consumption).7 8 This dis-
parity creates the possibility of paradoxical results. For example,
precommitting to future regulations can become optimum for society
even though the regulations are never worth their cost.79 It seems per-
discounted at a one percent rate over 20 years, is $820,000. With a zero discount rate, the present
value obviously equals $1 million. While this is a significant difference, uncertainties involved in
environmental cost-benefit analysis dwarf it. Consider, for example, the difficulties in determining
and monetarizing future risks, which are discussed in Part II.
77. The shorter time frames inherent in intragenerational discounting dampen its practical
significance and avoid the thorny philosophical issues involved in decisions affecting future genera-
tions. While this simplification is analytically useful, most real regulatory decisions involving mid-
and long-term environmental costs and benefits affect both current and future generations. See
text accompanying note 93.
78. For the government to devote resources-or require the private sector to devote re-
sources-to a program with a zero rate of return makes little sense. It could have used the same
funds instead to reduce the deficit, thereby eliminating a flow of one or two percent annually
payable by our taxpayers to foreign investors.
This argument applies even to lifesaving programs. If the value of saving a life is $5 million, at
a zero discount rate we would spend the same amount to save a life in 20 years. But if we spent the
same amount of money to reduce the national debt, we would receive about a one-percent annual
return, adding some interest savings to the $5 million. So the people affected by our decision would
prefer that we use the funds to reduce the national debt, decrease their obligations to foreign
investors, and not fund the regulatory program.
79. An example may clarify this point. Suppose that society will spend $5 million to save a
life (but no more), that a certain regulatory requirement can save a life at a cost of $6 million, and
that neither of these figures changes over time. Society will never want to adopt the regulation.
But society would agree to the following scheme: Today, place $4.5 million in a trust fund, invest-
ing only in risk-free securities; when the investment compounds to $6 million, spend it to imple-
ment the regulation. Using a zero discount rate for lives reveals that the present value of the
future life saved is $5 million (because we are applying a zero discount rate), while the present
value of the regulatory cost is only $4.5 million. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis justifies the trust
fund scheme and indicates that the government should adopt it, although it commits society to
expenditures whose benefits will be outweighted by their costs when they occur. The same logic
would support a similar device for any regulation, no matter how expensive, sufficiently far in the
future. In effect, this scheme places a higher practical significance on saving lives the farther in the
future they are.
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verse that society should precommit to adopting a regulation that soci-
ety finds unwarranted today and will find equally unwarranted when it
finally goes into effect.
Thus, we believe that policymakers should use the riskless invest-
ment rate as both a ceiling and a floor for the social discount rate. Ac-
cording to the most recent empirical evidence, this translates into a
discount rate of roughly one percent.8 0 Accordingly, in considering in-
tragenerational effects, we should discount future lives, but only at a
very low rate.
B. How Should Policymakers Assess Opportunity Costs?
In the previous section, we were primarily concerned with the in-
tertemporal preferences of consumers as a reason for discounting. The
fact that dollars invested to comply with regulation might otherwise
have been invested provides another justification for discounting future
regulatory benefits. Because the investment's benefits (saved lives) re-
main unrealized for several years, society "loses" the interest on the
dollars that it would have obtained if society had employed those dol-
lars elsewhere, earning interest or otherwise appreciating. Discounting
accounts for the societal loss of welfare due to foregone investment
opportunities.8'
It is important to realize that the opportunity cost rationale applies
to the investment in regulatory compliance, not to the value of the reg-
ulatory benefits. A life saved today does not earn interest to become
two lives twenty years from today. Conversely, if a regulation saves two
lives twenty years from today, it makes little sense to say that the op-
portunity cost of saving those lives means those two future lives are
only worth one life today. 2 Similarly, the question of whether full lung
80. See note 59 and accompanying text.
81. But see Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218. In overturning EPA's asbestos rule,
the Fifth Circuit stated that "soon-to-be-incurred costs are more harmful than postponable costs."
Id. This statement illustrates a practical danger of the more careful discount arguments advanced
by economists: policymakers and the public may misconstrue the import of the exercise. The court
apparently failed to distinguish opportunity costs from time preferences. The opportunity cost
rationale for discounting contends that society could have invested profitably elsewhere resources
that it expends to obtain future benefits (or avoid future harm), not that future injuries cause any
less harm than present ones. The court's language illustrates the unfortunate possibility that dis-
counting may convey a message that people should lower the significance that they attach to fu-
ture harms.
82. See Goodin, 2 J. Pub. Pol'y at 59 (cited in note 57). Goodin also advances interesting
criticisms of other aspects of discounting future benefits in public policy analysis. Arguably, ana-
lysts could consider having children a form of "interest," but practical considerations limit the
analogy's usefulness. For one thing, it would suggest a lower "present value" for the life of an
infertile person, which seems intolerable.
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capacity and ability to breathe freely at age thirty is any less valuable
than the same attributes at age twenty is still open. s3
If adopting a regulation decreases other investment, policymakers
should take into account the loss of the possible return from alternative
investments."4 Traditionally, they have done this by using the rate of
return on alternate investments to help determine the rate for discount-
ing benefits. This method is logically incorrect unless the regulatory
benefits and the alternate investments have the same temporal profiles.
Essentially, in applying the investment rate of return to regulatory ben-
efits, we are comparing regulatory benefits in the year they accrue with
the returns from a hypothetical private investment that would accrue in
the same year. This provides a measure of opportunity cost only if the
lost opportunity is indeed an investment whose returns will accrue in
that same year. 5
Because of this problem, economists increasingly have endorsed an
alternative method of handling opportunity costs by using a "shadow
price" for capital. The idea entails tracing the future returns (including
reinvestments) that society loses because a government project or man-
dated regulatory activity has diverted capital. In other words, the
method expresses the opportunity cost as a flow of returns to consum-
ers from alternate investments. The shadow price analysis then reduces
this flow to present value; since it is a consumption flow analysis, we use
consumer time preferences to determine the discount rate. 6
When analysts subject a government project to cost-benefit analy-
sis, determining the alternate investment return can be quite difficult.
It may depend on whether taxes or increased debt fund the projects,
whether the government sells its debt abroad or domestically, the time
profile of alternate private investments, the marginal propensity of con-
sumers to save, and the extent to which private savings go toward de-
83. See Merkhofer, Decision Science and Social Risk Management at 101 (cited in note 25).
Viscusi's answer to this argument is that it asks the wrong question. He says that even assuming
an equal willingness to pay to avoid such a loss at the time of occurrence, the analyst should give
greater weight to the money an individual is willing to pay at age 20 because the individual could
invest that money, thus the money would have a higher "terminal value." Viscusi, Valuation of
Risks at 196 (cited in note 20).
84. Assuming, of course, that policymaker bases the regulatory decision in part on compli-
ance costs. See Goodin, 2 J. Pub. Pol'y at 55.
85. See Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 50 (cited in note 53).
86. See id. at 41-42, 50; Joel D. Scheraga, Perspectives on Government Discounting Policies,
18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. S-65, S-69 to S-70 (1990). The seminal work was David F. Bradford,
Constraints on Government Investment Opportunities and the Choice of Discount Rate, 65 Am.
Econ. Rev. 887 (1975). For a concise statement, see David A. Starrett, Foundations of Public Eco-
nomics 193-94 (Cambridge, 1988).
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preciation rather than new investment8 7 Because the results are quite
sensitive to initial assumptions, analysts have some concerns about the
practical feasibility of this method of discounting for government-fi-
nanced projects.8
Fortunately, some recent research and analysis suggests that the
problem usually is simpler when the analysis focuses on government
regulations as opposed to government expenditures. Because private in-
vestments are amortized through depreciation, capital is not withdrawn
permanently from the investment pool. 9 ' Consequently, the analyst
needs to account only for the lag between the initial investment and the
depreciation recovery. Alternatively, the analyst need only consider the
interest payments that are passed on to consumers. Essentially, the
question resembles that of determining the economic viability of a new
toll road: society needs to compare the benefits received by consumers
to the amortized capital costs.90
The technicalities of determining the shadow price of capital are
beyond the scope of this Article. The key point is that the rate of return
on forgone private investments relates only to opportunity costs. It is
not logically relevant to determining the discount rate for regulatory
benefits. Those should be discounted (if at all) by using the social dis-
count rate, which is normally much lower.
IV. EQUITY TOWARD FUTURE GENERATIONS
A. The Scope of Intergenerational Responsibility
Discounting favors regulations that confer benefits in the present
or near future over regulations whose benefits society realizes at a later
date. One might even say that the purpose of discounting is to favor
present benefits over future benefits. Discounting also will generally
favor regulations that produce short-term benefits and long-term
87. See generally Symposium, The Social Discount Rate, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. S-1
(1990) (symposium on current state of the theory and practice of discounting costs and benefits of
government regulation). See also Lind, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. at S-8 (cited in note 59).
88. Id.
89. This assumes that private businesses pass their costs on to consumers. For a discussion of
the situation in which costs are paid solely from retained earnings, see Lind, Discounting for Time
and Risk at 450-51 (cited in note 53). The details of the simplified version of the "shadow price"
theory can be found in Jeffrey A. Kolb and Joel D. Scheraga, Discounting the Benefits and Costs
of Environmental Regulations, 9 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 381 (1990). Their approach translates
into the equivalent of a conventional discount rate of 5% to 10%, depending mostly on the "tail"
over which benefits occur. Because they used a three percent estimate for the consumption rate of
interest, while we believe a figure closer to one percent would be a better estimate, see note 56 and
accompanying text, we believe that these equivalent rates are still too high. See Kolb and Scher-
aga, 9 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. at 388.
90. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1465, 1483
(1989) (discussing the financing of a toll road and its implications for intergenerational equity).
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
costs."' Even a modest discount rate will favor small benefits conferred
today over much larger benefits conferred in the distant future.
A simplified hypothetical illustrates the import of these observa-
tions. Assume society is considering two proposals for construction of a
nuclear waste repository. For the sake of simplicity, also assume that
the two proposals have equal monetary costs, that society incurs those
costs in the same year, and that construction of either repository would
be completed in a single year. The first option is to build a repository
that will last for 500 years, but will almost certainly leak radiation and
cause one billion deaths at the end of the 500-year period. Suppose also
that we know that the construction of the repository proposed in option
one will result in the loss of no lives. The second option, because of
construction hazards inherent in its design, will likely result in the
death of at least one, but probably no more than two workers in the
year of construction. The second option will not leak in 500 years and
thus will not cause any deaths in 500 years. Finally, assume a five per-
cent discount rate.
Although unhappy with the choice, most members of society would
probably prefer to save one billion future lives at the cost of one cur-
rent life, even though society would not receive the benefit for five cen-
turies. However, if a policymaker applied cost-benefit analysis using
discounted benefits, she will choose the first option because one billion
lives 500 years hence have a lower present value than one life today.92
Although the above hypothetical is exaggerated, it vividly illus-
trates how discounting may discriminate against the future.9  Even in
more realistic scenarios, compound discounting often reduces large ben-
efits in the far future to present insignificance. Our previous discussion
concerned regulations whose benefits and costs will accrue primarily to
the same generation that promulgated the regulation. When a govern-
91. See Gillette and Hopkins, Federal Agency Valuations at 62 (cited in note 20).
92. This hypothetical is built on a discussion in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 357
(Clarendon, 1984).
93. A legitimate objection to the hypothetical is that it assumes society can estimate with
any accuracy the likelihood of events in 500 years. Because future benefits are uncertain, it may
make sense to discount them with respect to more certain current costs and benefits. A similar
argument from uncertainty is possible for much shorter time periods when our knowledge and
understanding of the future benefits of a policy is very limited. This is arguably the case in toxics
regulation-the current state of knowledge does not allow us to predict confidently the effects of
toxics in the environment on human health. For a good, accessible account of the problems and
limits of regulation in an environment of risk and uncertainty, see William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk in
A Free Society, 14 Envir. L. Rep. 10,190 (1984). See also Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
1027 (cited in note 79); Latin, 5 Yale J. Reg. at 89 (cited in note 7).
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ment regulatory decision confers costs or benefits on future generations,
additional issues arise.94
The most compelling questions regarding intergenerational effects
of discounting pertain to the rights of future generations and obliga-
tions of the present generation to the future. Although philosophical
debate about those questions extends beyond the scope of this Article,
it is probably safe to assume that most people agree we have at least
some responsibilities to consider and provide for the welfare of future
generations.9 Proceeding on that assumption, one facet of the debate
about discounting focuses on what discount rate, if any, comports with
our responsibility toward future generations. We will begin by briefly
canvassing some of the common arguments on the subject.
One argument in favor of discounting benefits to future generations
is that, without discounting, the present generation would sacrifice all
consumption, because the total benefits to infinite future generations
will always exceed any cost to a single current generation.96 However,
that argument proves persuasive only if society intends to maximize net
94. Many commentators seem to assume that the effects of regulation either occur in the
same generation or in future generations, and this discussion follows that division. However, gener-
ations of humans (unlike salmon) are not discrete; regulations whose costs and benefits are spread
out over 20 or more years affect both current and future (from the perspective of the population at
the time of regulation) generations. Because the benefits of toxics regulation will often extend over
such a period, the effects of such regulation are both intra- and intergenerational.
95. Discussions of these issues include Symposium, Agora: What Obligation Does Our Gen-
eration Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 Am. J. Intl. L.
190 (1990); James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 Ethics 804 (1986); Derek Parfit, Rea-
sons and Persons at 480 (cited in note 92); B. Barry, Justice Between Generations, in P.M.S.
Hacker and J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality and Society 268 (Clarendon, 1977); John Rawis, A Theory
of Justice §§ 44, 45 (cited in note 56). Much of the debate turns on the problem of how to assess
moral duties toward individuals whose very existence depends on our own actions. Adoption of any
major social or regulatory program will have at least some effect on people's lives, and hence on
whom they marry, the dates of their children's birth, and so forth-all of which means that chil-
dren will be born who are not identical to those who would have lived without the program. If
someone leads a happy life but dies at age 40 because of the program, is she worse off than she
would have been if, without the program, she had never been born? If not, can the program violate
any moral obligation owed to such members of future generations?
As Professor D'Amato suggests, even minor programs may have substantial effects on the
composition of future generations, due to what is called the "butterfly effect" in chaos theory.
Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environ-
ment? 84 Am J. Int'l L. 190, 192-93 (1990). When choices involve major programs and long time-
spans, our decisions may change the identity of virtually every member of a future generation.
Although the philosophical issues are intriguing, we agree with Derek Parfit (who first raised
the whole problem of "potential persons") that they have little practical relevance. See Derek
Parfit, Comments, 96 Ethics 854, 855 (1986).
96. This argument is summarized in Pearce and Turner, Economics of Natural Resources at
223-24 (cited in note 48). Reductio ad absurdum, failure to discount would leave all generations at
a subsistence level of existence, because benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future. Id.
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benefits over time, i.e., intergenerational efficiency." Society may also
prefer to distribute benefits equitably among generations. If, instead of
intergenerational efficiency, society cares about intergenerational eq-
uity, it does not need discounting to protect the legitimate interests of
the present generation against the claims of the future.9 8
An intermediate position might attempt to integrate the goals of
efficiency and equity. One possibility is for society to discount future
benefits but limit the total discount that it could apply to any future
benefit. This method would prevent discounting from diminishing bene-
fits below a certain level and avoid the kind of trivialization of distant
future effects epitomized in the nuclear waste repository hypothetical.9
Another argument that supporters of discounting future benefits
sometimes advance is that future generations will be wealthier; thus,
our descendants will value any marginal unit of benefit less because it
will represent a smaller portion of their total wealth. That "diminishing
marginal utility" argument provides little support, however, for dis-
counting future lives saved by regulation. The assumption that future
generations will have greater wealth seems somewhat less assured today
than as recently as thirty years ago. Even assuming that present condi-
tions justify such optimism, little evidence exists of an inverse relation-
ship between wealth and the value accorded to life and health. The
reverse is probably true: future generations may place a higher mone-
tary value on human health relative to other goods if their standard of
living increases. 00 The higher environmental, health, and safety stan-
dards in wealthy developed countries suggest that such a relationship
exists between societies in the current generation. 01
97. For a technical discussion of why intergenerational welfare maximization should not be
the exclusive goal, see Amartya Sen, Approaches to the Choice of Discount Rates for Social Cost-
Benefit Analysis, in Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 325.
98. Rawls makes this argument in a slightly different way. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice at
44 (cited in note 56). An objection to this argument is that it assumes that current and future
generations have the same preferences and needs. See Gillette and Hopkins, Federal Agency Valu-
ations at 59 (cited in note 20). For example, future generations might prefer that we mind our own
business and leave them to their own devices. However, as the authors acknowledge, determining
some other set of future preferences would be a difficult (if not futile) task. Id.
99. Proponents can make a stronger argument for the use of intergenerational equity as a
constraint on discounting future benefits when the contemplated future benefit is the quality of
natural resources passed to succeeding generations. See Talbot Page, Intergenerational Equity
and the Social Rate of Discount, in V. Kerry Smith, ed., Environmental Resources and Applied
Welfare Economics 71 (Resources for the Future, 1988). Most scholarly discussions of the in-
tergenerational impact of discounting in environmental policymaking focus on policies involving
natural resources and ecology, not human health. We believe that a pragmatic argument exists for
adopting a stewardship ethic regarding natural resources. See Part W.B.
100. See Merkhofer, Decision Science at 101 (cited in note 25).
101. We would argue, however, that the discount rate should not be shifted down on this
basis for two reasons. First, if our descendants will be wealthier, it seems dubious that we should
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We do not find any of the conventional arguments strongly persua-
sive. Without pretending to provide a definitive statement regarding
duties toward future generations, however, we do think that agreement
on some basic points may facilitate progress toward a practical
resolution.
Because we will appeal at several points to commonly held views
about intergenerational responsibilities, we first should clarify what role
these conventional views play in the analysis. We believe that in a dem-
ocratic society, popular values are entitled to prima facie acceptance in
public decisionmaking. This does not mean that decisionmakers
(whether legislators, administrators, or judges) must slavishly follow
public opinion, but only that they should have some adequate grounds
for deviation. In particular, when the values in question are as basic as
the ones we are about to discuss, decisionmakers should not deviate
from those values without strong reasons, which we have not identified
in this context. Moreover, because we are dealing with such long-term
issues, even a decisionmaker who gives no weight to current public
opinion must be concerned with the public's future views. To be sus-
tainable, a long-term environmental program must be capable of main-
taining public support over the long haul; otherwise, the program
cannot hope to survive long enough to be effective. Of course, deci-
sionmakers may sometimes gamble on the future, hoping that public
opinion will shift in their direction. We are skeptical, however, that
most people are likely to have a radical change of heart about such
fundamental personal questions as their own responsibilities toward
their children and grandchildren.
As a practical matter, members of the current generation probably
are unwilling to make greater sacrifices for anonymous members of fu-
ture generations than they are for their own personal descendants.
Thus, feelings of obligations toward descendants provide an upward
practical bound on obligations toward future generations as a whole., 2
If everyone in the current generation had equal wealth, each would un-
dertake to save enough for her own descendants in order to provide this
level of future welfare. 103
shift additional wealth forward to them, which would be the result of lowering the discount rate.
Second, if we are going to take this factor into account at all, it should be used properly to adjust
the valuation of life and health benefits in future time periods, which then should be discounted to
present value at the usual discount rate.
102. See Epstein, 67 Tex. L. Rev. at 1472-77 (cited in note 90) (suggesting the use of in-
terfamilial obligations as a baseline).
103. Of course, the current generation suffers from tremendous wealth inequalities. We may
have moral obligations to assure a fairer distribution of income to the descendants of today's im-
poverished nations, but this seems no different from the obligation we have toward those nations
1993]
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With respect to private goods, intergenerational effects raise no
special problems because the decisions of individuals to save for their
descendants satisfies society's obligation to future generations. As to
public goods"' such as environmental quality, the situation is more
complex. Each member of the current generation likely would be willing
to sacrifice some current consumption in order to assure his descend-
ants' access to public goods. As usual in public good situations, how-
ever, each member cannot do this without providing a free ride-in this
situation, to other peoples' descendants. The optimum social decision
requires the current generation as a whole to sacrifice the collective
consumption needed to provide the desired level of public goods in the
future. In other words, with respect to public goods, we can no longer
consider each family separately but must consider each generation col-
lectively. However, the objective remains to approximate the level of
sacrifice that each family individually would undertake willingly, in the
absence of a free ride, to provide the benefits of public goods to their
descendants alone. The aggregate of those individual sacrifices would
provide the necessary collective sacrifice required of the current
generation.
Unfortunately, empirical measurement of the amounts individuals
are willing to sacrifice for a future public good would encounter all the
difficulties-perception, imperfect information, etc.-inherent in the es-
timation of individuals' risk and time preferences and individual valua-
tions of human life.10 5 These practical measurement difficulties seem to
necessitate the use of a proxy measure. As a practical matter, the re-
sponsibility to provide for personal descendants probably provides the
best benchmark for this generation's obligations to future generations.
This benchmark enables us to invoke some widely shared intu-
itions. First, whether the language of "moral obligation" is appropriate
when considering unborn descendants is not clear. If your great-grand-
parents squandered the family fortune, you may feel that they acted
today. Thus, we can separate the problem of intergenerational equity from that of determining the
fair distribution of wealth within each generation.
104. The key characteristics of public goods are joint supply and nonexcludability, which
together mean that everybody essentially consumes the same amount of the good. (Nonex-
cludability means that preventing individuals from consuming the goods once they are made avail-
able is impractical; joint supply means that supplying the goods jointly is more efficient because of
declining marginal cost.) National defense and clean air provide classic examples of goods with
these characteristics. A government can only supply these goods practicably to the population as a
whole. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II 10-11 (Cambridge, 1989).
To the extent that individuals care about the general future welfare of society, as opposed to
that of their own descendants, social welfare itself takes on some of the attributes of a public good.
This means that privately determined discount rates may not be appropriate. See Sen, Choice of
Discount Rates at 326-37 (cited in note 97).
105. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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reprehensibly, but you would have difficulty charging them with violat-
ing a personal obligation toward you or with violating a "right" that you
possessed. For this reason, we think the language of "responsibility"
rather than "obligation" is more appropriate: mature individuals be-
have responsibly with respect to the interests of their descendants, but
do not necessarily owe a "duty" to as-yet nonexistent individuals. Our
point is not that the interests of future generations place no constraints
on the current generation, but that "rights talk" is a problematic way of
discussing the ethical issues.
Second, nothing requires members of the current generation to
maximize the income of their descendants, with or without a discount
factor. They are not even required to ensure future income levels equal
to their own: we would not necessarily consider it irresponsible for ex-
tremely rich parents to leave their children only moderately rich. For
this reason, the current generation is not truly a trustee with a moral
obligation to preserve the entire corpus for future generations. 106 Re-
sponsible individuals do attempt, however, to ensure that their de-
scendants can enjoy a decent standard of living, at least if they can do
this without extreme self-sacrifice. You would have grounds for com-
plaint if your great-grandparents had taken actions that consigned you
to poverty in order for them to live a life of luxury. Again, it might be
improper to say that they had violated the "rights" of their future de-
scendants, but they clearly would have acted irresponsibly.
Third, whether or not it is rationally defensible, we think that
members of the current generation are felt to have a more compelling
obligation toward the next generation (and perhaps at least to young
grandchildren) than to later generations. °7 Members of the current
generations would be subject to criticism if they did not give the long-
term welfare of their children substantial weight; any large discount
factor significantly undercuts this responsibility.
Thus, in weighing extremely long-term benefits (more than about
one generation in the future), discounting is not a particularly useful
technique. This generation's responsibility to later generations seems to
involve a side constraint necessary to ensure them a minimum level of
welfare, rather than weighing their welfare against our own as part of a
maximization problem. As a practical matter, we probably cannot pro-
106. Contrast Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenera-
tional Equity, 11 Ecology L. Q. 495 (1984) (arguing that the current generation holds the natural
resources of the planet in trust for future generations and must act as prudent "trustees" for
future beneficiaries, taking care to preserve the "corpus").
107. Empirical studies support this observation. See, for example, Cropper, Aydede, and
Portney, 73 Am. J. Agric. Econ. at 1412-13 (cited in note 66); Cropper and Portney, 3 J. Risk &
Uncertainty at 375 (cited in note 66).
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ject benefits with even minimal confidence over long periods such as
over a century. Even if we could predict some benefits with a degree of
accuracy over such long periods, today's generation likely would refuse
to make severe sacrifices simply to create marginal improvements in the
welfare of distant future generations. We can, however, realistically at-
tempt to avoid substantial risks of future disaster to remote descend-
ants. With few exceptions, these risks will pose dangers to the next
generation as well, so our concern for the next generation will usually
subsume these very long-term effects.
A maximization approach may have more relevance to decisions af-
fecting the next generation or so, meaning that we might reasonably
apply some discount factor. Arguably, we should weigh the welfare of
our (collective) children equally with our own. In any event, society
cannot set the discount factor too high, since it must accord significant
weight to the interests of the next generation. In particular, the dis-
count rate even for economic benefits cannot significantly exceed the
expected long-term rate of economic growth; otherwise, we would dis-
count even the destruction of most future Gross Domestic Product to a
low present value o'er periods of only decades.108 Practically, these con-
siderations require a discount rate no greater than one or two percent.
B. Intergenerational Opportunity Costs
So far, we have been concerned about the problem of discounting
benefits that future generations will experience. As we stressed above,
this is a separate problem from evaluating opportunity costs. Lawrence
Summers, the World Bank's chief economist, has invoked opportunity
costs as an argument for a high discount rate for benefits accruing to
future generations:
Each project must have a higher return (taking account of both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benefits) than alternative uses of the funds. Standard public non-
environmental investments like sewage-treatment facilities, education programmes,
or World Bank transport projects have returns of more than 10%. Most private
investors apply even higher "hurdle rates" in evaluating investments, generally
15% or more, because higher-return alternatives are available.
Once costs and benefits are properly measured, it cannot be in posterity's in-
terest for us to undertake investments that yield less than the best return. At the
108. As Professor Lind explains:
Suppose we select a social discount rate based on present consumer rates or the rate of return
on investment. Historically, any such rate is likely to exceed the rate of growth of the econ-
omy, often by a large amount. Then the basic arithmetic of exponential growth applied in a
cost-benefit analysis implies that, regardless of how small the cost today of preventing an
environmental catastrophe that will eventually wipe out the entire economy, it would not be
worth this cost to the present generation if the benefits in the future are sufficiently distant.
To most of us, this would seem a highly questionable if not immoral public policy.
Lind, 18 Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. at S-20 (cited in note 59).
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long-term horizons that figure in the environmental debate, this really matters. A
dollar invested at 10% will be worth six times as much a century from now as a
dollar invested at 8% .... 209
By this point, the fallacy in Summers's argument should be clear.
Using the higher discount rates to measure opportunity cost assumes
the actual alternative investments were projects having benefits that
compounded over a century. This is unrealistic. If the typical govern-
ment project has a twenty-year life (and the typical private project
probably has a much shorter life), then at the end of the twenty years,
consumers may receive a high return on the investment. Often, only a
small part of that consumer return will be reinvested voluntarily in a
new project because the return from that project will be in a nonmone-
tary form, incapable of reinvestment in that form. Moreover, the margi-
nal propensity to save is, in any event, far below unity.110 Using the
more appropriate "shadow price of capital" approach, the proper dis-
count rate that society should use to evaluate a project over the century
is much lower than the return on any short-term project.
Although Summers does not directly address this point, he may
have in mind a different scenario. The higher discount rate would be
appropriate if we could make a binding commitment today to invest in
higher return projects (such as those of the World Bank) and to rein-
vest all of the proceeds of the projects in new Bank projects. The prob-
lem is that we cannot make meaningful irrevocable commitments
regarding government (let alone private) actions over many decades.
For precisely this reason, environmental investments may offer a
useful opportunity for precommitment. We may obtain higher returns
for the next generation by making investments today that pay lower
annual returns but over longer periods. In this respect, social decision-
making may properly incorporate some of the procedures used by indi-
viduals, who make different investments at different interest rates in
the interests of precommitment. Environmental protection may be the
societal equivalent of the "Christmas club," in which this generation
invests at low returns simply to protect ourselves from wavering com-
109. Lawrence H. Summers, Summers on Sustainable Growth, The Economist 65 (May 30,
1992). 0MB subscribes to the same rationale. See Randolph M. Lyon, Federal Discount Rate Pol-
icy, the Shadow Price of Capital and Challenges for Reforms, 18 J. Envir. Econ. & Mgmt. S-29, S-
32 (1990).
110. For example, Lind uses 0.2 as the marginal propensity to save. See Robert Lind, The
Rate of Discount and the Application of Social Benefit-Cost Analysis in the Context of Energy
Policy Decisions, in Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 443, 447 (cited in note 53). The
underlying insight is that individuals are likely to consume at least some of their (real) investment
income rather than reinvesting all of their returns. Indeed, even if they "roll over" their invest-
ments, they may increase their consumption from other sources of income because of their greater
wealth.
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mitments (here, as a collectivity, rather than as individuals). Eliminat-
ing carcinogens may be a psychologically appealing savings plan. It also
may be easier to protect a rain forest or the ozone layer-which might
produce a two-percent annual return over a century at the cost of $1
billion in current consumption-than to give $1 billion to the World
Bank now and commit ourselves and our descendants to the progres-
sively larger future contributions to the Bank necessary to reinvest fully
all of the benefits of Bank projects. This generation probably could pre-
serve the rain forest more easily than a government fund, because of
the forest's vividness as a tangible symbol of the heritage of "capital"
passed down between generations. Similar reasoning may justify a "sus-
tainability" requirement, which would require maintaining the world's
"stock of natural capital," '111 as a method of maintaining intergenera-
tional savings.
There is a more general point here. In considering opportunity
costs, society should consider only other opportunities that it might ac-
tually implement; in short, it should choose among the most desirable
of the feasible alternatives. In the interest of environmental protection,
people might willingly sacrifice $1 billion of current consumption. This
does not necessarily mean that they would desire to pay an extra $1
billion in taxes to finance World Bank development projects, or to save
an extra $1 billion for private investment. Instead, absent the environ-
mental regulation, they simply might consume the extra $1 billion.
Thus, in considering the opportunity cost of environmental decisions,
society must determine which are realistic political and social
alternatives.
Returning to the familial context we explored earlier, parents who
wish to ensure their offspring's inheritance may have difficulty putting
aside savings for this purpose. They may find it easier (though in some
sense less efficient) to hold onto some family heirlooms, even though
those heirlooms appreciate in value more slowly than some other invest-
ments. We suggested earlier that the present generation does not actu-
ally act as a trustee for the future; the ethical responsibilities of the
present generation are more complex than the trust relationship im-
plies. Nevertheless, in some contexts acting as if members of the pre-
sent generation are trustees may be useful. A stewardship ethic may
function as a way of committing the present generation to savings for
future generations in a situation in which society considers it difficult
otherwise to carry out long-term plans that it considers ethically desira-
111. See Pearce and Turner, Economics of Natural Resource at 225 (cited in note 48). For a
more general discussion of sustainability as an ethical stance, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Should We
Green the Bill?, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 159, 162-63.
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ble. Such a stewardship ethic does not require that this generation give
great weight to the interests of distant generations. Instead, it merely
requires this generation to maintain its global inheritance intact during
its children's lives, leaving it to them to apply the same ethic to their
own successors. Like runners in a relay race, society may do best when
it concentrates on passing the baton to the next runner, leaving the rest
of the race to the succeeding runners.
Some readers may think that this approach is short-sighted be-
cause it stresses commitments to nearby generations over those farther
into the future. We do not believe that our approach slights the long-
term interests of the human race. Our approach concerns planning for
the full life-spans of this generation's children. This substantially in-
creases the time horizons typically used by today's politicians." 12
Moreover, we have doubts about the workability of any horizon
much longer than the life of the next generation. Motivating individuals
to make sacrifices for returns that are delayed much longer than the
lifespans of their own children would be very difficult. For this genera-
tion to design democratic institutions that would keep a given social
program in place for such long time periods would be even more diffi-
cult. Thus, as a practical matter any policy choice made today has only
a finite period of effectiveness. Finally, even if this generation could
"lock in" policy choices for many generations, it probably would choose
not to do so. This generation has extremely poor information about
long-term policy impacts, and present decisions will undoubtedly re-
quire later corrections. Trying to forecast and solve the problems of our
distant descendants would be a mistake. The present generation will do
well enough if it leaves its successors a livable world and well-designed
institutions with which to make their own choices.
We earlier rejected the idea that the current generation is morally a
trustee for the overall welfare of future generations. 1 3 Nevertheless, our
analysis suggests that for society to think in terms of a more limited
"trust" may be useful. First, the current generation may have difficulty
meeting its own savings goals for future generations, and it may be use-
ful to treat aspects of the ecosystem as if they were family heirlooms as
a technique of increasing savings. Second, the current generation also
has at least a responsibility to leave later generations the minimum re-
quirements for decent lives, which means avoiding any severe, irrepara-
112. We fear that politicians may use a horizon as short as two years. For some disturbing
observations about the short-sightedness of our political system, see David E. Rosenbaum, Playing
it Safe: The Paralysis of No-Pain Politics, N.Y. Times, § 4 at 10 (Apr. 19, 1992). For an analysis of
why politicians use high discount rates, see Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Non, The Political
Discount Rate (Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 209, 1990).
113. See text accompanying note 106.
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ble environmental damage. Depending on the level of sensitivity of the
global ecosystem, this may place substantial constraints on current
decisions.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Some advocates of cost-benefit analysis seem to view it as provid-
ing an objective, reliable standard for policy decisions. We reject the
view that cost-benefit analysis defines the right answer for both norma-
tive and practical reasons.
First, at most cost-benefit analysis can show only that the benefits
of a policy exceed its costs: that is, the winners could afford to compen-
sate the losers for their losses. 114 This standard can be problematic even
when dealing with small policy changes and short periods of time, be-
cause it fails to address distributional effects." ' With larger policy
changes-large enough to have ripple effects on prices and out-
puts-the application of this standard becomes more debatable. No un-
ambiguous way may exist for deciding which of two very different
economic states leaves consumers better off." ' Long time spans com-
pound these effects. The compensation standard becomes fanciful when
the question is whether individuals yet to be born would willingly pay
compensation (via a time machine?) to today's consumers. Thus, cost-
benefit analysis becomes increasingly questionable as a normative stan-
dard when the current generation considers choices with global or very
long-term impacts.
Notorious questions exist concerning the validity of the willing-
ness-to-pay standard for valuing outcomes. Government regulations
often involve risks for which no private market exists. For example,
there is no private market in which consumers pay for changes in the
carcinogen content of their families' air. Economists estimate the value
of those changes to consumers based on other estimates (themselves not
very reliable) of what people willingly pay to avoid safety hazards in the
workplace. If a market for safe air existed, prices might well diverge
from those in the employment safety market. In reality, studies of how
people evaluate various risks suggest that prospective employees place
114. Thus, cost-benefit analysis embodies the Kaldor-Hicks standard for economic efficiency,
under which an action is economically efficient if the winners could compensate the losers from
their gains. See David W. Barnes and Lynn A. Stout, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics
16 (West, 1992).
115. See, for example, Barnes and Stout, Law and Economics at 17; A. Mitchell Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 7-10 (Little, Brown, 1983).
116. This is a consequence of Arrow's theorem. It is also the reason why economists cannot
choose base years for determining inflation that are too far in the past; the typical consumer's
"basket of goods" changes too much to make precise comparisons very meaningful.
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importance on many factors other than mortality rates.117 Thus, the
preferences at issue are somewhat hypothetical and assignment of pre-
cise values elusive.
This becomes even more apparent when we consider long-term
risks. Some researchers have asked people to choose between saving
some number of lives today and saving a greater number in the fu-
ture. 118 We doubt that these results measure some preexisting prefer-
ence, that in some sense is already present in people's heads. Why
should people possess preferences about choices they have never had to
make and reasonably can expect to have no future power over? Instead,
the responses are simply the efforts of individuals to comment, without
very much opportunity for thought, on a hard issue of public policy. In
short, they most likely are exhibiting offhand opinions on the same pol-
icy issue to which the cost-benefit analyst purports to give his own an-
swer, not private preferences that might be reflected in their own
market transactions. Asking people for an instant opinion on an issue is
an interesting enterprise, but not a promising method for making hard
decisions.
Quite apart from these normative questions, as we have seen, cost-
benefit analysis as a practical matter is far from being a determinative
technique. The problems we have seen with determining the proper dis-
count rate merely exemplify this. Equally difficult problems persist in
determining the proper figure to use for the value of human life or the
intrinsic value of living in a world with redwoods, whales, and rain for-
ests.119 Trying to establish quantitative risk estimates is even more
speculative. Because of the severe limits on current scientific knowl-
edge, we often can do little more than make educated guesses about the
effects of a chemical on human health or on the greenhouse effect. As a
result of these uncertainties, cost-benefit analysis can really only iden-
tify a few highly promising projects or rule out extremely poor
projects.2 0 Most decisions fall into a grey area in which the cost-benefit
analysis turns on discretionary technical choices. Hence, cost-benefit
analysis can often serve most effectively as a method of triage.
Thus, we reject the view that cost-benefit analysis provides the so-
lution to the problems of weighing various policy options and their
117. See Hornstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 584-629 (cited in note 31) (stating that public per-
ceptions about risk correctly take into account equity and other important factors, not just the
expected number of empirical deaths).
118. See, for example, Cropper, Aydede, and Portney, 73 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1410 (cited in
note 67); Cropper and Portney, 3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 369 (cited in note 66).
119. See Part ll.B.
120. See Robert Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for
Evaluating National Energy Options, in Lind, Discounting for Time and Risk at 21, 24 (cited in
note 53).
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ramifications. On the other hand, environmental regulation does involve
difficult tradeoffs, and economic analysis, including cost-benefit analy-
sis, can help clarify those trade-offs. For example, establishing the
"shadow price" of capital illuminates the extent of total consumption
that society sacrifices because of a government regulation or project.
Similarly, if we determine the extent to which people demand compen-
sation for safety risks in labor markets, we have at least a starting point
in considering the extent to which society should sacrifice to eliminate
other risks. And if the question is whether to reduce current consump-
tion for future benefits, examination of private savings rates gives us
some guidance. If people are unwilling to save at a zero percent interest
rate, the government should not undertake such savings on their behalf
without some good reason to believe that private preferences have gone
awry. Cost-benefit analysis thus incorporates useful factors, but some-
times makes the mistake of seeking to turn guidelines and insights into
definitive answers.
Our conclusions should not be taken as an attack on economic
analysis. On the contrary, economists themselves fully realize the limits
of cost-benefit analysis. As Robert Lind has said:
[B]enefit-cost analysis need not and cannot provide precise answers to policy ques-
tions. Rather it is a procedure that can provide a crude but highly useful picture of
the relative merits of alternative policies. It therefore can be used to identify those
investments that are either very good or very bad. Benefit-cost analysis also or-
ganizes data that bear on policy decisions and does so in a way that educates us
about the important elements of a problem and allows us to test the sensitivity of
the decisions to changes in those elements.
12 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Choosing the proper discount rate seems to be the most esoteric of
technical issues. Certainly, perusing a page or two of the dense equa-
tions in the economics literature does little to dissipate that impression.
But this problem actually involves both fundamental questions about
the operation of the economy and profound issues regarding this gener-
ation's responsibility toward the future. It would be highly presumptu-
ous for us to purport to provide a definitive resolution to technical
issues that divide leading economists or to other problems that are
hotly debated by professional philosophers.
On the other hand, real world decisions about public policy cannot
await a definitive academic consensus. If policymakers view cost-benefit
analysis as a technique for organizing information and clarifying trade-
offs, it becomes less important to settle on a precise figure for the dis-
121. Id. at 24.
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count rate and more important to understand the policy dimensions of
that determination. One of the primary goals of this Article has been to
"unpack" the debate over discounting so that readers can more knowl-
edgeably make their own assessments of the proper treatment of future
regulatory effects.
In dealing with issues of this complexity, identifying the right an-
swer is often difficult, but ruling out some wrong answers is easier. Un-
fortunately, for many years, OMB has implemented a defective policy
regarding discount rates. 12 2 As with the deficit,123 society has been sad-
dled with policies that increase short-term consumption at the expense
of long-term welfare. The consequence has been to encourage myopia
by regulatory agencies.
We have also tried to articulate a working approach to the issues
for use by policymakers. Briefly, we have four recommendations:
(1) Policymakers should discount intragenerational environmental
benefits at the social discount rate (one percent or so).
(2) They should assess opportunity costs of regulations using the
"shadow price" of capital if possible. 124
(3) Society's concern about future generations should focus mostly
on the welfare of the next generation, although it should be careful
not to expose later generations to serious deprivation (including
major ecological damage).
122. In 1972, the OMB promulgated the circular providing a 10% rate. See 0MB Circular A-
94 (1972). President Reagan issued an executive order in 1981 which required that agencies subject
all major rules to "regulatory impact analysis" (essentially cost-benefit analysis). This effectively
applied the OMB discount rules to the analysis of all major regulations. See Executive Order No.
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981). President Bush recently directed federal agencies to subject
legislative proposals to cost-benefit analysis, further increasing the impact of the OMB discount
policy. See note 19. Responding to the common criticism that the current 10% rate is too high,
OMB recently proposed an overhaul of its discounting policy, including a reduction in the stan-
dard discount rate. See Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Pro-
grams, 57 Fed. Reg. 35163 (1992). The proposed revision made available for public comment
suggests a reduction of the discount rate to 7% based on a 4% estimate of the consumption rate of
interest. Because we advocate a consumption rate of 1% to 2%, we think the proposed reduction,
at least in its current form, would address inadequately the concerns expressed in this Article.
123. See generally, Symposium on the Budget Deficit, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 17 (1989).
124. OMB considers the shadow price approach too complicated and recommends that agen-
cies use a single discount rate for all costs and benefits, relying on the shadow price approach only
to perform sensitivity analysis. As 0MB concedes, the shadow price approach becomes more ap-
propriate "the smaller the fraction of costs that are capital costs financed out of saving and the
longer the time period between costs and benefits." OMB, Regulatory Program of the United
States Government, Appendix V: Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance 727-28 (1992). In its pro-
posed discount rate revision, OMB suggests that the shadow price of capital approach "is the ana-
lytically preferred means of capturing the effects of Government projects on resource allocation in
the private sector" but provides little further guidance for the use of this alternative in federal
agencies' policy analysis. See Draft Revised OMB Circular No. A-94, 9 (unpublished draft, July 17,
1992) (emphasis added).
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(4) With respect to the next generation, policymakers should use a
low discount rate (probably around the social discount rate).
One of the cliches of recent public life has been that our society is
"eating its seed corn." We believe that renewed attention to the future
is a national priority. In technical terms, this requires a changed ap-
proach to discounting.
